Jurisprudential definitions of relevant institutions for the field: concept of family (s); parenting, parental responsibility and co-responsibility; best interests of the child; right of the child to be heard; progressive autonom

The subject of the norm control proceedings was, in particular, the question of whether various criminal law provisions on abortion satisfy the state's constitutional duty to protect unborn human life.
The FCC held that state's duty to protect all state authority in relation to unborn life, which arises from Art. 1.1 in conjunction with Art. 2.2 of the Basic Law, requires above all protection from unlawful interventions by others. The right to life arises here, independently of an acceptance on the part of the mother, solely on the basis of the existence of the unborn child. 
The protection of life vis-à-vis the mother can only be realized through a fundamental prohibition of abortion and the concomitant obligation to carry the child to term. The same protection must be guaranteed against direct and indirect interference by third parties. 
An absolute protection of the unborn life opposite other legal interests - on the part of the pregnant woman in particular Art. 1.1, 2.1 and 2 of the Basic Law - is not required. Rather, it requires a legislative design in compliance with the prohibition of inadequacy, whereby the age of pregnancy is not decisive. 
The minimum requirements that exist according to this include the fundamental prohibition of abortion for the entire duration of the pregnancy with simultaneous recognition of an exceptional situation in the case of unreasonableness. The waiver of the protective effect of criminal law is also inadmissible. 
The fulfillment of the duty to protect is not exhausted in the defense against attacks, but requires a consideration of the real living conditions of the woman as well as the mitigation of aggravating circumstances. In addition, the right to protection of unborn life must be maintained and revived in the general consciousness. 
The legislature provides for a counseling concept that refrains from establishing indications, within the framework of which the pregnant woman bears the ultimate responsibility. 
A waiver of punishment for the abortion carried out after such counseling can only take place in a constitutionally permissible manner through an exception to the facts of § 218 StGB, but not through the assumption of justification. Only then does it remain open how the abortion is to be judged in other parts of the legal system. 
The formulation of the counseling regulation does not establish with sufficient certainty that a subsequent request for an abortion is a responsible and constitutionally permissible decision when viewed from a typical perspective.